

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Intelligence Requirements for Joint Task Force Three

CIA has no positive evidence of present Soviet efforts at personal penetration of JTF3 operations for purposes of espionage or sabotage. However, Soviet and Communist capabilities in this respect are believed considerable, and intensive efforts may be expected. Deductions from the technical data obtainable from the program should indicate the most probable methods of penetration.

CIA does not believe that political considerations would in any way deter Soviet efforts to penetrate JTF3 personnel with Soviet or Communist agents. Political considerations, however, may well deter the USSR from employing, for espionage or sabotage purposes, such open and direct means as landing parties or armed attacks. Such measures would, from the Kremlin's point of view, be likely to have an unfavorable effect on world opinion, and would clearly reveal the degree of Soviet anxiety regarding US progress in atomic development.

The USSR probably would seek to use any news of US atomic tests to support the Soviet position in the United Nations. Soviet representatives would renew their efforts to enlist the support of neutral nations for international control of atomic weapons on Soviet terms. Renewed Soviet proposals for general disarmament and various other "peace" moves might also be expected.

In its propaganda treatment of US atomic development, the USSR has in the past:

a. Postponed official comment on Western announcements, i.e., Moscow immediately reported the US announcement of the A-bomb, but there was a week's delay until official comment followed; Moscow delayed mentioning the H-bomb to the Russians for about five weeks and kept comment to Satellite and world audiences to a minimum.

b. Commented on the atomic bomb in the most general terms, with little mention of its capabilities, in an attempt to conceal its effectiveness.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

c. Only rarely designated the H-bomb by that name to the Soviet people, and usually described it as a "super bomb."

d. Expressed doubts concerning US ability to produce the H-bomb and "new atomic weapons," referring to the former as a US bluff designed for intimidation.

e. Attempted to convince Satellite audiences that the USSR had or soon would be able to construct the "super-bomb."

f. Attempted to divide the Western Powers by claiming the US was not sharing its atomic secrets and was, in fact, using them to intimidate its own allies.

Meanwhile, there has been little or no propaganda exploitation of Soviet atomic achievements. Moscow followed President Truman's announcement of the Soviet explosion with only the briefest factual reports and very little comment, despite the apparent advantages to be gained in terms of bolstering Soviet and Satellite morale by stressing Soviet atomic progress.

On the basis of the foregoing precedent, it is estimated that, if the USSR obtains through other than sensitive sources knowledge of US tests of atomic or other "super" weapons to be held in or before 1951, in its propaganda treatment the USSR would:

a. Refer to US atomic weapons only in broad general terms, avoiding mention of specific weapons or their capabilities, and being careful not to jeopardize the security of Soviet intelligence sources.

b. Relittle US achievements and cast doubt on their significance by implying that the tests were a "US bluff" designed to intimidate the USSR and other "peace-loving" nations.

c. Illustrate within these limitations US "aggressive" intentions and emphasize the need for renewed peace efforts.

d. Exploit indications of a forthcoming US test at the second World Peace Congress scheduled for October, 1950, and direct the World Peace Partisans to use any news of plans for such tests to intensify their campaign for the abolition of all atomic weapons.

e. If representatives of other Western Powers are not invited to observe such tests, contend that the US was holding out on its allies and intended, through atomic weapons, to achieve ultimate domination not only of the Soviet "democracies" but all Western nations as well.

ORE:D/Pub:WOW/co

Distribution: DCI, Central Records, AD/ORE (2),
D/Pub, D/EE, OSI, OSO

Approved For Release 2002/01/25 : CIA-RDP75-00662R000100040059-6

MP-15

~~SECRET~~